This paper offers a comprehensive look at the state of empirical research in the field of arbitration. Its release coincides with the reintroduction of the Arbitration Fairness Act, which would constitute the most significant reform of arbitration law in the United States since the FAA's enactment. Moving beyond typical the typical punch/counterpunch that has characterized much of the policy debate in this area, this paper identifies areas of common ground on which arbitration's proponents and opponents can agree. It then consider (...) an issue-by-issue critique of arbitration and responds in detail to several of the recent attacks on the field. The paper closes by charting out a research agenda on arbitration and urges Congress to act cautiously before deciding whether to reform this important method of dispute resolution. (shrink)

Walton’s book aims to supply a fresh method for evaluating logical reasoning and legal argumentation. Drawn from philosophy, law and science, Walton’s method rests on a theory of “plausibilistic” reasoning or “probabilism”. According to plausibilistic reasoning, we can logically infer conclusions from a set of premises even though the premises are neither definite nor of a measurable probability. We may tentatively draw such inferences so long as they rest on generally valid premises. To illustrate this method, Walton cites a famous (...) example from Wigmore: A man had no money before a robbery, but suddenly came into a great deal of money following the robbery. It is therefore plausible to infer that the man committed the robbery. (shrink)

Besides pure declarative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are declaratives, and pure imperative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are imperatives, there are mixed-premise arguments, whose premises include both imperatives and declaratives, and cross-species arguments, whose premises are declaratives and whose conclusions are imperatives or vice versa. I propose a general definition of argument validity: an argument is valid exactly if, necessarily, every fact that sustains its premises also sustains its conclusion, where a fact sustains an imperative exactly if it favors (...) the satisfaction over the violation proposition of the imperative, and a fact sustains a declarative exactly if, necessarily, the declarative is true if the fact exists. I argue that this definition yields as special cases the standard definition of validity for pure declarative arguments and my previously defended definition of validity for pure imperative arguments, and that it yields intuitively acceptable results for mixed-premise and cross-species arguments. (shrink)

In discussing the psychiatric diagnoses, the author explores not the “formal” diagnoses of the so-called mental illnesses, but the “informal” judgments made by psychotherapists in regard to their method or the process of their therapy. These diagnoses include transference, repression, resistance, denial, negativism, projection, and suppression. While these are not precisely the symptoms of psychopathology, they are an integral part of the language which psychotherapists use to describe and label what they see as problems in their patients. These so-called problems, (...) which are interpreted by the therapist as existing within the patient, can be reinterpreted and largely avoided in philosophical counseeling.The author argues that, when a person is observed or diagnosed by a psychotherapist as exhibiting one of these supposedly problematic traits the therapist is in fact misinterpreting what is going on. (shrink)

This essay traces a case in which I was involved. It illustrates that counselors and clients can have very different worldviews, down to and including different views concerning the existence of God, and yet philosophy can do its work in the counseling setting. It also illustrates that straight thinking can be very valuable to both religious and irreligious persons.

Controversies in science have a tendency to be long-lasting. Moreover, they tend to wither rather than be solved by sorting out the arguments pro and con. Barring the sociological dimension, an important factor in the perpetuation of scientific controversies seems to be the contestants' passion for broad philosophical theses when it comes to defending their respective positions. In this paper one such controversy is analysed. It involves the alleged use of Popperian falsificationism to defend a position in (community) ecology some (...) years ago. The upshot of the analysis is that falsificationism is altogether irrelevant to the controversy's solution; philosophy, though, is utterly relevant if one limits it to elementary, uncontroversial, normative methodological principles. (shrink)

More involvement of sub-Saharan African countries in biomedical studies, specifically in genetic research, is needed to advance individualized medicine that will benefit non-European populations. Missing infrastructure, cultural and religious beliefs as well as lack of understanding of research benefits can pose a challenge to recruitment. Here we describe recruitment efforts for a large genetic study requiring three-generation pedigrees within the Yoruba homelands of Nigeria. The aim of the study was to identify genes responsible for keloids, a wound healing disorder. We (...) also discuss ethical and logistical considerations that we encountered in preparation for this research endeavor. (shrink)

The Principal Principle (PP) says that, for any proposition A, given any admissible evidence and the proposition that the chance of A is x%, one's conditional credence in A should be x%. Humean Supervenience (HS) claims that, among possible worlds like ours, no two differ without differing in the spacetime-point-by-spacetime-point arrangement of local properties. David Lewis (1986b, 1994a) has argued that PP contradicts HS, and the validity of his argument has been endorsed by Bigelow et al. (1993), Thau (1994), Hall (...) (1994), Strevens (1995), Ismael (1996), Hoefer (1997), and Black (1998). Against this consensus, I argue that PP might not contradict HS: Lewis's argument is invalid, and every attempt – within a broad class of attempts – to amend the argument fails. (shrink)

Ever since ecology's inception, the concept of competition has generated discussion. Recent discussions have focused on the role of interspecific competition in shaping the structure of ecological communities. More in particular, ecologists are split up over the validity of a method that is currently in vogue to discredit explanations of community structure in terms of competition theory. An analysis of this controversy is presented which attempts to show that the discussions so far have focused on the wrong issues. Not the (...) method's ability to generate alternative explanations should be questioned, but its ability to generate superior explanations. The impact of Popperian philosophy of science on the dispute is briefly discussed. (shrink)

Amit Goswami published his book, "The Self-Aware Universe: How Consciousness Creates the Material World", in 1993. In 1996, he and Henry Swift started up the online newsletter Science Within Consciousness, which carries articles and news features connected with the Goswamian philosophy. Below, I comment on Goswami 's metaphysical theories as represented in his writings in the SWC newsletter, especially in his pieces: Monistic Idealism May Provide Better Ontology for Cognitive Science: A Reply to Dyer, The Hard Question: View from A (...) Science Within Consciousness, Toward an Understanding of the Paranormal, Amit Goswami was a professor at the Institute of Theoretical Science at the University of Oregon. He taught physics for 32 years in the USA, mostly at Oregon. He now is Senior Resident Researcher at the Institute of Noetic Sciences. (shrink)

I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the (...) bulk of the paper I address six objections to OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

Ideas about the mechanisms that regulate chromosome pairing, recombination, and segregation during meiosis have gained in molecular detail over the last few years. The purpose of this article is to survey briefly the shifts in paradigms and experiments that have generated new perspectives. It has never been very clear what it is that brings together the homologous chromosomes at meiotic prophase. For a while it appeared that the synaptonemal complex might be the nuclear organelle responsible for synapsis, but the supporting (...) evidence has not been entirely convincing. Whatever the mechanism, it has always been assumed that homologous synapsis creates the opportunity for homologous DNA sequences to initiate recombination. At present, alternative ideas are developing. Attractive is the concept that double strand DNA repair mechanisms, that find and use the undamaged homologue for repair, have evolved into a meiotic mechanism for the recognition and pairing of homologous sequences. Subsequent intimate synapsis of homologous chromosomes in the context of the synaptonemal complex may serve later functions in the regulation of interference and segregation at first anaphase. A number of areas that are being tested at present and some that may be investigated in the future are discussed at the end of the review. (shrink)

Critiques existing theoretical approaches and practices of philosophical counseling and presents a new model.

You may not know me well enough to evaluate me in terms of my moral character, but I take it you believe I can be evaluated: it sounds strange to say that I am indeterminate, neither good nor bad nor intermediate. Yet I argue that the claim that most people are indeterminate is the conclusion of a sound argument—the indeterminacy paradox—with two premises: (1) most people are fragmented (they would behave deplorably in many and admirably in many other situations); (2) (...) fragmentation entails indeterminacy. I support (1) by examining psychological experiments in which most participants behave deplorably (e.g., by maltreating “prisoners” in a simulated prison) or admirably (e.g., by intervening in a simulated theft). I support (2) by arguing that, according to certain plausible conceptions, character evaluations presuppose behavioral consistency (lack of fragmentation). Possible reactions to the paradox include: (a) denying that the experiments are relevant to character; (b) upholding conceptions according to which character evaluations do not presuppose consistency; (c) granting that most people are indeterminate and explaining why it appears otherwise. I defend (c) against (a) and (b). (shrink)

Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: "kiss me and hug me" is the conjunction of "kiss me" with "hug me". This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, (...) I argue. "If you love me, kiss me", a conditional imperative, mixes a declarative antecedent ("you love me") with an imperative consequent ("kiss me"); it is satisfied if you love and kiss me, violated if you love but don't kiss me, and avoided if you don't love me. So we need a logic of three -valued imperatives which mixes declaratives with imperatives. I develop such a logic. (shrink)

This paper presents arguments and evidence from psychology and neuroscience supporting Lipton’s 2004 claim that scientists create knowledge through an abductive process that he calls “Inference to the Best Explanation”. The paper develops two conclusions. Conclusion 1 is that without conscious effort on our part, our brains use a process very similar to abduction as a powerful way of interpreting sensory information. To support Conclusion 1, evidence from psychology and neuroscience is presented that suggests that what we humans perceive through (...) our senses is not reality, but rather, our ‘brain’s “best guess” of the causes of its sensory input. The implication of this best guessing is that our brains use a process very similar to abduction throughout our lives to inform us of what is happening in the world around us. In addition, an argument based on Darwinian evolution is presented claiming that our brains do an excellent job of interpreting sensory information from the outside world. (If they did not, we, as a species, could hardly have survived.) Combining these two claims leads to Conclusion 1. Building on Conclusion 1, Conclusion 2 is that Lipton and others are correct in claiming that scientists use abduction when creating scientific theories. Abduction must be strong, because Nature chose abduction for its own sensemaking purposes. This paper’s contribution to knowledge is in pointing out that recent psychological and neuroscientific research has major implications for the philosophical world’s confidence in the probable validity of abductive inference. The punchline is simple: Nature chose abduction! (shrink)

Why does classical equilibrium statistical mechanics work? Malament and Zabell (1980) noticed that, for ergodic dynamical systems, the unique absolutely continuous invariant probability measure is the microcanonical. Earman and Rédei (1996) replied that systems of interest are very probably not ergodic, so that absolutely continuous invariant probability measures very distant from the microcanonical exist. In response I define the generalized properties of epsilon-ergodicity and epsilon-continuity, I review computational evidence indicating that systems of interest are epsilon-ergodic, I adapt Malament and Zabell’s (...) defense of absolute continuity to support epsilon-continuity, and I prove that, for epsilon-ergodic systems, every epsilon-continuous invariant probability measure is very close to the microcanonical. (shrink)

Rural development and economic change has generally been associated with growth and the in-migration of nonlocal firms or their branch plants and offices. Such change has been critiqued and at times resisted because of its implicit “urbanism” and conflict with rural values and modes of social interaction. The inevitability of the conflict has always been assumed, given the perspectives of development groups and many rural residents. This paper examines the apparent conflicts between the rural ethos and the “growth ethos,” and (...) the considers the necessity for the pursuit of the forms of growth that tend to undermine rural values. The severely limited set of changes in the local economy considered by the common forms of growth-sponsoring economic development groups is then examined. Finally, the existence of alternative forms of economic change are hypothesized and their viability demonstrated. We conclude that improved economic well-being for rural residents need not sacrifice their values and lifestyles on the altar of urban-influenced “economic growth.”. (shrink)

Vaesen's description of uniquely human tool-related cognitive abilities rings true but would be enhanced by an account of how those abilities would have evolved. I suggest that a process of technological selection operated on the cognitive architecture of ancestral hominids because they, unlike other tool-using species, depended on tools for their survival.

Besides pure declarative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are declaratives (“you sinned shamelessly; so you sinned”), and pure imperative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are imperatives (“repent quickly; so repent”), there are mixed-premise arguments, whose premises include both imperatives and declaratives (“if you sinned, repent; you sinned; so repent”), and cross-species arguments, whose premises are declaratives and whose conclusions are imperatives (“you must repent; so repent”) or vice versa (“repent; so you can repent”). I propose a general definition of argument (...) validity: an argument is valid exactly if, necessarily, every fact that sustains its premises also sustains its conclusion, where a fact sustains an imperative exactly if it favors the satisfaction over the violation of the imperative, and a fact sustains a declarative exactly if, necessarily, the declarative is true if the fact exists. I argue that this definition yields as special cases the standard definition of validity for pure declarative arguments and my previously defended definition of validity for pure imperative arguments, and that it yields intuitively acceptable results for mixed-premise and cross-species arguments. (shrink)